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When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal
with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a
legislative acorn.
Justice Rehnquist in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores'
* B.A. 1971, St. Joseph's College; J.D. magna cum laude 1974, Dickinson
School of Law; Associate, LaBrun and Doak, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
I. Introduction
Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Securities and Ex-
change Act "may well be the most litigated provisions in the federal
securities laws."2  The cause of action impliedly granted by rule
1 Ob-5 3 often gives plaintiffs a better chance of recovery than is
available under state law, thereby encouraging "invocation of the sal-
utary anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws in cases
where those provisions are wholly inappropriate and wide of the
Congressional mark."'
To counter this trend of using federal courts and federal securi-
ties laws to litigate matters more properly heard in state courts under
state laws, courts have restricted the right to bring suit under rule
10b-5. The most notable restriction limits standing to sue under
rule lOb-5 to those plaintiffs who actually have purchased or sold
securities involved in the alleged fraud.5 This restriction, commonly
referred to as the Birnbaum rule, has been criticized severely in
recent years by commentators' and has received varying treatment
from courts, ranging from liberal interpretation 7 to strict application s
to outright rejection.9 Additionally, several exceptions to the doc-
trine have been judicially created.' 0
The resultant confusion concerning the vitality" of the Birn-
baum doctrine was heightened in recent years by the persistent re-
fusal of the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in appeals from circuit
2. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969).
3. E.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
4. Ryan v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 453 F.2d 444, 445 (2d Cir. 1971).
5. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952).
6. E.g., Lowenfels, Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule
10b-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 168 (1968); Comment, Rule 10b-5: Protection for an Amor-
phous Class, 78 DICK. L. REV. 661 (1974); Comment, Standing Under Birnbaum:
The Case of the Missing Remedy, 24 HAsT. L.J. 1007 (1973).
7. E.g., James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973) (de facto
seller); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970) (forced seller doc-
trine).
8. E.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
960 (1974); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Erling v. Powell,
429 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1970).
9. Eason v. GMAC, 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974).
10. E.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967)
(plaintiff in suit for injunctive relief need not be purchaser or seller).
11. Despite the repeated (albeit premature) obituaries for the Birnbaum doc-
trine, e.g., Lowenfels, Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5,
54 VA. L. REv. 168 (1968); Comment, Another Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine:
Tolls the Knell of Parting Day?, 15 U. MIAMI L. REV. 131 (1970), Judge Wisdom
of the Fifth Circuit, in one of the last pre-Blue Chip cases dealing with standing un-
der lOb-5, stated that "at least with respect to actions for damages, Birnbaum main-




court opinions interpreting Birnbaum.2 The Court's reluctance to
deal with the issue was patently apparent on April 22, 1974, when
it denied certiorari in two appeals: one from a Third Circuit opinion
that held buyer or seller status "indispensable" to the maintenance
of a cause of action under l0b-5; 1" another from a Seventh Circuit
decision in which the purchaser-seller rule was held no longer "part
of the law of this circuit."'
4
Certiorari was eventually granted, however, to an appeal from
the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip
Stamps.'5 In that case plaintiffs were neither actual purchasers nor
sellers of securities, but claimed to have been fraudulently induced
not to purchase stock that they were entitled to buy at bargain rates.
The court of appeals found that they had standing to sue under rule
lOb-5. On June 9, 1975, however, the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit and held that Birnbaum was "rightly decided:"'16 non-
purchasers and nonsellers, including plaintiff-respondents, are
barred from maintaining actions under 10b-5.
The Court's decision in Blue Chip is as much a landmark in
securities litigation as Birnbaum; it will certainly be cited time and
again by defense attorneys in support of motions to dismiss for lack
of standing. It must be noted, however, that even though Blue Chip
clearly establishes that one who alleges only that he was defrauded
into not purchasing or selling is without standing under lOb-5,
many complex gray areas of the standing question under 10b-5
remain open to dispute.
This article will discuss the formulation of the Birnbaum doc-
trine, its treatment, and its evolution up to Blue Chip. Then, Blue
Chip will be analyzed. Finally, the post-Blue Chip future of the
pre-Blue Chip exceptions and modifications to the Birnbaum rule
will be considered.
12. E.g., Eason v. GMAC, 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 960 (1974); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 960 (1974); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
950 (1970); Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
13. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 158 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
960 (1974).
14. Eason v. GMAC, 490 F.2d 654, 661 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
960 (1974).
15. 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
16. 421 U.S. at 731.
II. Formulation of the Birnbaum Doctrine
A. The Implied Cause of Action Granted by Rule lOb-5
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act authorized the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to prescribe rules and regulations
necessary or appropriate for protection of securities investors. 7 Pur-
suant to this rule-making power, the SEC promulgated rule lOb-5:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.'8
Although neither section 10(b) nor rule 10b-5 specifically
grants a private cause of action for violation thereof, courts have long
held that a private right of redress is implied.19 In fact, the right
to bring a private, civil action has become recognized so universally
that the Supreme Court in its first direct comment disposed of the
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). Section 10(b) states,
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(a) ... ;
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors.
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975) (emphasis supplied).
19. E.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
In that case the court held that there was an implied cause of action for violation
of rule lOb-5 based on § 186 of the Restatement of Torts, which provides that in
certain specified instances violation of a statute is tortious and will render the violator
civilly liable.
By granting an implied cause of action, courts felt they were effectively aiding
enforcement of the Act. In Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953),
the court stated,
Congress intended to make control of securities transactions 'reasonably and
completely' effective as that phrase is used in the preamble of the Act. We
can think of nothing that would tend more toward discouraging trading off
the established business markets and out of governmental regulation or that
would more certainly tend to deter fraudulent practices in security transac-
tions and thus make the Act more 'reasonably complete and effective' than
the right of defrauded sellers or buyers of securities to seek redress in dam-
ages in federal courts.
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question in a footnote, stating, "It is now established that a private
right of action is implied under § 10(b)."'
B. Birnbaum Limits on the Cause of Action
Courts constantly expressed fear that the implied cause of ac-
tion granted by rule lOb-5, if not limited in some fashion, "would
establish a new and amorphous body of rights and obligations here-
tofore unrecognized in federal jurisdiction."'" Therefore, restric-
tions were placed on the availability of this private right of action.
The first key restriction was announced by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.22
A minority shareholder of the Newport Steel Corporation brought
suit for violation of rule 1Ob-5 after a merger offer from Follansbee
Steel was rejected by Newport's president, who then sold his control-
ling interest in Newport to the Wilport Company at twice the market
rate. As part of the sales agreement the president and other direc-
tors of Newport resigned their seats, leaving Wilport free to elect
a new board. Plaintiffs alleged fraudulent conduct on the part of
Newport's president, charging him with misrepresentations in the
termination of the Follansbee merger talks and in the reporting of
his own sales to Newport's stockholders. Although the alleged con-
duct constituted a clear violation of rule 1Ob-5, the district court dis-
missed the complaint because plaintiffs, being neither purchasers nor
sellers of securities in connection with which this fraud had occurred,
had no standing to sue under the rule.23
This dismissal was upheld by the court of appeals in a landmark
opinion written by Judge Augustus N. Hand. Judge Hand declared
that section 10(b) was
directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent
practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securi-
ties rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate af-
fairs, and that Rule X-lOb-5 extended protection only to the de-
frauded purchaser or seller. Since the complaint failed to allege
that any of the plaintiffs fell within either class, the judgment of
the district court was correct and is accordingly affirmed.
24
20. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971).
21. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 158 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
960 (1974).
22. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
23. 98 F. Supp. 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
24. 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952) (emphasis
supplied).
Hand's declaration actually dealt with two interrelated topics and set
up two distinct rules. In the first clause of the quotation above,
Judge Hand established a narrow substantive scope for rule lOb-5.
25
The second portion limited standing to sue under rule lOb-5 to pur-
chasers or sellers of securities in connection with which the alleged
fraud occurred. This second rule, known as the Birnbaum or pur-
chaser-seller rule, is the rule that was reaffirmed in Blue Chip.
C. Traditional Application of the Purchaser-Seller Rule
In the twenty-three years between Birnbaum and Blue Chip,
the rule was applied time and again to bar 1 Ob-5 actions by putative
plaintiffs who were neither purchasers nor sellers and who were un-
able to qualify for any of the judicially created exceptions or modi-
fications to the Birnbaum doctrine.26 The Third Circuit's decision
in Landy v. FDIC2 7 represents a typical application of the purchaser-
seller rule.
Landy arose out of the collapse of the Eatontown National
Bank. Suit was brought by a stockholder of that bank, charging the
bank's president with using bank funds to finance his own stock mar-
ket speculation. The basis of the suit against the bank president
was that he had engaged in fraudulent securities transactions to the
detriment of the bank's stockholders. The complaint was dismissed
for lack of standing by the district court2 s and the dismissal was
unanimously affirmed by the court of appeals.29
Judge Rosenn, speaking for the court, set forth two compelling
reasons for following the Birnbaum doctrine:
25. Recent cases have expanded the scope of rule lOb-5 to the extent that the
fraud need only "touch" the purchase or sale of securities. E.g., Superintendent of
Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow,
375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) (rule lOb-5 reaches all types of fraudulent schemes,
not just the "garden variety").
The Seventh Circuit apparently viewed its repudiation of the Birnbaum pur-
chaser-seller rule in Eason v. GMAC, 490 F.2d 654, 661 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974), as merely a logical consequence of the then current trend
away from the narrow scope of Birnbaum:
As Judge Sprecher demonstrated in Jannes v. Microwave Communica-
tions, Inc. [citation omitted], the basic holding of Birnbaum [that lOb-5
applied only to the type of fraud 'usually associated with the sale or pur-
chase of securities'] was repudiated by a unanimous Supreme Court in the
Bankers Life case. We are convinced that the purchaser-seller limitation
is nothing more than an appendage to that holding without independent jus-
tification. We hold that it is not part of the law of this circuit.
26. E.g., Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967);
Fox v. Prudent Resources Trust, 382 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Ingenito v. Bernac
Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Morrow v. Schapiro, 334 F. Supp. 399
(E.D. Mo. 1971).
27. 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
28. Landy v. FDIC, Civil No. - (D.N.J., Sept. 9, 1971).




[F]irst, the purpose of Congress in enacting section 10(b) was
merely to extend to sellers of securities the same protection that
had been afforded to buyers under the 1933 Securities Act; sec-
ond, only Congress should change an interpretation of an act un-
broken since its passage.
3 0
The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the Supreme Court's
decision in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Cas-
ualty Co. 31 eliminated the purchaser-seller requirement. Although
conceding that certain cases following Bankers Life had expanded
the zone of interests covered by rule 1Ob-5, Judge Rosenn emphat-
ically stated,
Rule 10b-5's expanded zone of interests under Bankers Life
would not encompass the plaintiffs' interests in this case. They
did not engage in any market transactions with the defendants
by which they sustained their losses. Were we to extend the
provisions of section 10(b) beyond the buyer or seller relation-
ship, we would be judicially extending the terms of the statute
and creating new rights. The consequences of the view urged by
plaintiffs would establish a new and amorphous body of rights
and obligations heretofore unrecognized in federal jurisdiction.
Buyer or seller status is indispensable in establishing liability for
damages under rule 1Ob-5.32
Judge Rosenn also noted that the requirement that 1Ob-5 plaintiffs
be purchasers or sellers is consistent with the general rules of stand-
ing.
Normally, standing is accorded only where 'the interest sought
to be protected or regulated by the complainant is arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question.' Because these
plaintiffs [being neither purchasers nor sellers] are not within
that zone, they have no standing to assert violations of rule lOb-
5.33
Thus, Landy set forth three distinct reasons for adhering to the
Birnbaum purchaser-seller rule: (1) congressional intent in enact-
ing section 10(b) was merely to extend to sellers the protection al-
ready enjoyed by buyers; (2) any change in a doctrine of such long
standing is up to the legislature; and (3) general principles of stand-
ing require plaintiffs to be either purchasers or sellers. Each of
30. Id. at 156-57.
31. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
32. Landy v. FDIC, 486 ,F.2d 139, 158 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
960 (1974) (emphasis supplied). No extensive discussion of Bankers Life appeared
in Blue Chip.
33. id. at 158.
these reasons has been relied on by other courts in upholding the
Birnbaum rule. 4
On the other hand, there had been a growing realization that
strict application of the rule often led to anomalous results85 and
sometimes frustrated, rather than furthered, the congressional policy
in enacting section 10(b) and the SEC's policy in promulgating rule
lOb-5. Accordingly, the trend prior to Blue Chip was away from
strict application of the purchaser-seller rule. Numerous modifica-
tions of the rule were created. Additionally, some courts held the
rule inapplicable to suits for injunctive relief.86 The Seventh Cir-
cuit took the final step by totally rejecting the Birnbaum rule.17  Af-
ter Blue Chip the Seventh Circuit's total rejection of the purchaser-
seller rule can no longer be regarded as the law even in that circuit.
Yet, the fate of various modifications of and exceptions to the Birn-
baum doctrine is not so clear. Therefore, the next section is devoted
to examining the pre-Blue Chip trend away from strict application
of the purchaser-seller rule with the hope that examination of this
trend and discussion of Blue Chip in the succeeding section will pro-
vide useful guidelines for projecting the future rules for 1Ob-5 stand-
ing.
III. Evolution of the Birnbaum Doctrine
A. Major Modifications of the Purchaser-Seller Rule8
1. The Forced Seller Doctrine.-This doctrine39 was first an-
34. E.g., Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972);
Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Iroquois Indus., 'Inc. v. Syracuse
China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
35. For example, when the allegedly fraudulent transaction is a merger, share-
holders of the disappearing corporation usually have standing, e.g., Knauff v. Utah
Mining & Constr. Co., 408 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1969), as does the corporation issuing
securities to facilitate the merger, Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967), but strict application of the purchaser-seller
rule would deny standing to shareholders in the surviving corporation because they
have neither bought nor sold any securities in connection with the merger.
36. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
37. Eason v. GMAC, 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974).
38. The rule that a plaintiff suing derivatively under lob-5 need not be person-
ally a purchaser or seller of the securities in question, so long as the corporation on
whose behalf suit is brought was a purchaser or seller, e.g., Shell v. Hensley, 430
F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Dolin v. Vipont Mining Co., 384 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D.
Pa. 1974), might be regarded as a modification of the Birnbaum rule. In fact, an
earlier study, Comment, Rule 10b-5: Protection for an Amorphous Class, 78 DICK.
L. REV. 661, 679 (1974), suggests that these cases represent an "abandonment" of
the purchaser-seller rule. On the contrary, it is clear that affording standing to plain-
tiff in a derivative action in which the corporation was a purchaser or seller repre-
sents neither a modification nor an abandonment of Birnbaum. Rather, it is simply
a logical application of the universally acknowledged rule that in a derivative action
the corporation is the real party plaintiff.
39. The term "forced seller" as used in this article refers to a plaintiff who
Blue Chip Stamps
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
nounced by Judge Feinberg of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.4" In Vine the plaintiff,
a class A stockholder of Crown Finance Company, brought suit for
damages under rule 10b-5, alleging that Beneficial had acted in con-
cert with officers and directors of Crown to defraud Crown's class
A stockholders. The alleged fraud consisted of appropriation for
class B stockholders of nine hundred thousand dollars that should
have gone to class A stockholders and merger of Crown into Benefi-
cial for eight hundred thousand dollars less than fair market value.
Beneficial accomplished the merger by purchasing ninety-five per-
cent of Crown's class A shares through a tender offer and, then, ef-
fectuating a short term merger that left the remaining five percent
of class A stockholders with only an option to convert their shares
for cash. Plaintiff did not exercise this option to convert and, there-
fore, still held his class A shares when he brought suit. District
Judge Bonsal granted defendant's motion for dismissal because
plaintiff was not a defrauded seller as required by Birnbaum.4
The Second Circuit, however, reversed the district court's dis-
missal, holding that the statutory definitions of "purchase"4 2 and
"sell ' 4 3 were broad enough to include plaintiff, whose shares had
been "involuntarily converted into a claim for cash."" Rather than
has neither purchased nor sold, but who nonetheless has been granted standing under
lOb-5 because defendant's fraudulent conduct will clearly force him to sell at some
future time. Not included in this term are plaintiffs who have been forced or tricked
into an actual purchase or sale. E.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Airbrake Co., 419
F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967);
Jefferies & Co. v. Arkus-Duntov, 357 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In these cases
plaintiff's actual purchase or sale entitles him to lOb-5 standing under Birnbaum.
40. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). Judge Fein-
berg also first announced the injunctive relief exception in Mutual Shares Corp. v.
Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
41. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 252 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 374
F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
42. "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract to buy, purchase
or otherwise acquire." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(13)
(1970).
43. "The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise
dispose of." Id. § 78(c)(14).
44. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 970 (1967):
[O]nce the conditions for a short form merger had been achieved, appel-
lant's rights in the stock were frozen. He had and still has only the options
of exchanging his stock for $3.29 a share, pursuant to appellee's offer, or
pursuing his right of appraisal, which would also result in cash from appel-
lee. . . . Since, in order to realize any value for his stock, appellant must
exchange the shares for money from appellee, as a practical matter appel-
requiring appellant to go through the "needless formality" of such
a sale to acquire standing under the purchaser-seller rule, Judge
Feinberg ruled that economic realities would control and that plain-
tiff would be considered a seller with standing to sue under rule 10b-
545
After Vine the forced seller doctrine was applied and extended
by the Fifth Circuit in Coffee v. Permian Corp.46 and Dudley v.
Southeastern Factor & Finance Corp.47  In Coffee, plaintiff, a mi-
nority stockholder in a small corporation that had been acquired and
liquidated fraudulently by defendant, sued under rule 10b-5. The
district court dismissed the case, holding that plaintiff lacked stand-
ing because he still held his shares and, therefore, was neither a pur-
chaser nor seller.4" Vine was distinguished by the district court be-
cause that case involved a merger while Coffee involved a liquida-
tion. 49  The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed the district court, hold-
ing as the court had in Vine that plaintiff had no choice but to con-
vert his shares into cash and thus would be considered a seller under
rule lOb-5. 50
In Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Finance Corp.5 the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit extended the forced seller doctrine
even further. The court held that even though defendant had not
yet completely liquidated the corporation in which plaintiff was a
shareholder, the corporation had been reduced to a nonfunctioning
entity, with the result that plaintiffs investment in a going enterprise
had been commuted to a right to a cash payment. Therefore, under
Vine and Coffee, plaintiff was considered a seller with 10b-5 stand-
ing.52  The court cautioned, however, as it had in Coffee, that its
holding was confined to the granting of a dismissal, in which a plain-
tiffs allegations must be taken as true.53  The court implied that if
trial revealed that the liquidation had not been carried out as alleged
by plaintiff, plaintiff's status as a forced seller would be lost and the
case dismissed. 54
lant must eventually become a party to a 'sale' as that term has always been
used.
45. Id. at 635.
46. 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970).
47. 446 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1971).
48. Coffee v. Permian Corp., 306 F. Supp. 1371, 1375 (N.D. Tex.), rev'd,
434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970).
49. Id. at 1373.
50. 434 F.2d at 386.
51. 446 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1971).
52. Id. at 308.
53. Id. The concept that modification of Birnbaum is permissible because it
is "only" for purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss is completely at odds with
Blue Chip, which cites the inability of defendants to obtain dismissals as a key dis-




Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd.55 indicated how far courts might
go in applying the forced seller doctrine. In that case Molson Indus-
tries, a Canadian corporation, made a tender offer to acquire Anthes
shares for the purpose of merging Anthes into Molson. Anthes also
was a Canadian corporation and about ninety percent of the Anthes
stockholders were Canadians. Molson's tender offer was extended
only to these Canadian shareholders. Plaintiff and other American
shareholders were not invited to participate in the tender offer, but
were promised a later deal on comparable terms. Relying on this
promise, plaintiffs did not attempt to sell their Anthes stock on the
open market while the tender offer was effective. After Molson had
acquired ninety percent of Anthes, however, it announced that An-
thes would be merged into Molson, thereby effectively eliminating
any public market for Anthes stock. Molson then made an offer
to plaintiff-shareholders for their Anthes stock at a much lower price
than plaintiffs could have received for their shares on the open mar-
ket immediately following the tender offer. Faced with a threat that
even this low offer might be withdrawn, plaintiffs sold their stock
to Molson.
In a subsequent suit under rule 10b-5, this actual sale was held
to confer standing.56 The Eighth Circuit, in dicta, added that even
without an actual sale, plaintiffs would have had standing to sue un-
der the forced seller doctrine of Vine because Molson had effectively
eliminated any free market for their stock and left plaintiffs no
choice but to sell to Molson.
57
The Third Circuit took a more limited view of the forced seller
doctrine in Landy v. FDIC.5 s  Plaintiff-stockholders of the bank
noted that defendant's illegal speculation in the stock market with
bank funds had caused the collapse and impending liquidation of the
bank and argued that they were thus entitled to standing as forced
sellers. This contention was rejected by Judge Rosenn:
Each of these 'forced seller' cases possesses elements not present
in the case before us. In each case, the majority shareholders
55. 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
56. Id. at 522.
57. Id. at 523. The future of the forced seller doctrine after Blue Chip is not
altogether clear. But even if the basic doctrine does survive, its interpretation in
Travis is clearly erroneous because it would confer standing on any shareholder of
a corporation whose stock is not freely traded. Federal courts would be burdened
with a flood of cases more properly the concern of state courts.
58. 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
of a corporation or other insiders were taking advantage of its
minority shareholders. . . .In each, the fraudulent scheme was
directly related to and in connection with the forced sale.
59
The court regarded the situation in Landy as mere corporate mis-
management or, at most, fraud on the corporation, not the share-
holders.
Under these circumstances, we do not believe the broad pur-
poses of the Act would be served by extending standing to these
plaintiffs. Granting standing to them might confer standing to
sue as 'forced sellers' upon shareholders in any corporation in
bankruptcy because of an unfortunate securities transaction. No
case has gone so far, and we decline to do so.60
2. De Facto Sellers.-When the interests in a security are di-
vided among several parties, strict application of the purchaser-seller
rule would confer standing only upon the party with legal title at the
time of sale. To alleviate the obvious inequities of this situation,
several courts have granted standing to de facto sellers who were
real parties in interest although not legal titleholders at the time of
sale.
In the only appellate decision applying this doctrine, James v.
Gerber Products Co.,6" plaintiff, the beneficiary of a testamentary
trust from which securities were sold, brought suit under rule 10b-
5, alleging a fraudulent sale. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that Old
State Bank, trustee and seller of the securities, and Gerber Products
Company, purchaser of the securities, had interlocking directorates
and that this relationship caused the securities to be sold fraudu-
lently for less than market value. The district court dismissed the
suit for lack of standing, but was reversed on appeal.
In reaching this decision Judge Peck of the Sixth Circuit ig-
nored legal technicalities to protect plaintiff's economic interest: "As
beneficiary, she was the person who was to be benefited by the sale
and thus she had the interests of a de facto seller."62  The court
rejected defendants' argument that the distinction between legal and
equitable interests was a valid basis for determining standing under
rule 10b-5 and, instead, held that plaintiff as the real party in interest
had standing to sue.6 The court declared that
59. Id. at 159.
60. Id. Even if the forced seller doctrine survives Blue Chip, Landy clearly
represents the better interpretation. When the fraud involved is of the type prohib-
ited by rule lOb-5, the forced seller doctrine may be useful to grant standing to plain-
tiffs who might be barred by strict application of the purchaser-seller rule. The doc-
trine should not be extended, however, to every case in which plaintiffs are sharehold-
ers of a bankrupt corporation. When bankruptcy is caused by mismanagement, the
cause of action would be more appropriately heard in state courts. Molasky v. Gar-
finkle, 380 F. Supp. 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
61. 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973).
62. Id. at 948.
63. Id. In reaching this decision Judge Peck disagreed with a district court
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there is only one interest at stake here and that is the benefici-
ary's. No one here argues that if the trustee had been de-
frauded into selling the shares, it could not initiate an action for
relief under lOb-5. But of course, if the trustee was a party to
the fraud, it could scarcely be expected to institute such an ac-
tion. Consequently, were we to accept the appellee's argument,
we would be faced with an unacceptable situation where alleged
fraudulent securities transactions occurred which, if true, are
prohibited by federal statute and regulation but the party in in-
terest who actually suffered the fraud would be without an ave-
nue of redress in the federal courts. 64
To bolster its decision the court relied on Heyman v. Heyman,
6 5
in which plaintiff was also a trust beneficiary suing under rule 10b-
5 for alleged fraud in the sale of stock by her trustees. In that case
plaintiff attempted to establish her standing as a forced seller under
Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.66 and as a party seeking injunctive
relief under Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc. 7  Both argu-
ments were rejected. Vine was read by the court as a "response to
the unique position of a minority stockholder after a short form mer-
ger"66 and thus inapposite to plaintiffs case. Mutual Shares was
found applicable only to suits for prospective injunctive relief and
therefore inapplicable to cases in which the fraudulent transaction
had already been consummated. 69  Even though plaintiff failed to
establish standing under these precedents, District Judge Bauman
found her economic interest in the sale sufficient to distinguish the
case from Birnbaum and its progeny.
Although not the seller, she was one who immediately stood to
gain or lose by the sale; it was for her benefit . . . that the sale
was made. In cases such as Birnbaum and Mutual Shares, it
must be remembered, plaintiffs were not only nonsellers; they
were not involved, directly or indirectly, in a sale. The sales, in
each case, had been concluded between defendants and third
case, Rippey v. Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 260 F. Supp. 704 (D. Colo. 1966),
which held that a trust beneficiary does not have standing under rule 10b-5. Judge
Peck also distinguished Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, reviewed en banc,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), which cited a trust beneficiary as an example of a
party that would have no standing under rule lOb-5, on the grounds that this language
was mere dicta and, even if it were not dicta, that an interlocking directorate was
not present in Schoenbaum.
64. Id. at 949. Depriving plaintiff of a federal remedy is not unacceptable to
Justice Powell. In his concurring opinion in Blue Chip he noted that state remedies
are available.
65. 356 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
66. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
67. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
68. Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958, 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
69. Id.
parties. Here, plaintiff's connection with the sale is much
closer; . . . she was the beneficiary of the sale. That is a nexus
missing in the line of cases which follow Birnbaum.
70
Moreover, the policy of Birnbaum-to foreclose suits for corporate
mismanagement unrelated to securities transactions--did not bar
plaintiff's standing. 71 Therefore, the court in Heyman, like the
court in James, disregarded plaintiff's technical status and conferred
standing on her as a de facto seller.
72
In a case not cited in James, Cambridge Capital Corp. v. North-
western National Bank of Minneapolis,73 a federal district court ap-
plied an economic analysis to confer lOb-5 standing on a plaintiff
who was not the legal titleholder at the time of sale. In that case
plaintiff sold shares of stock to Charter Management, Inc. Charter
paid for the stock with a three hundred fifty thousand dollar promis-
sory note secured by the stock transferred. Charter then used the
stock to obtain a five hundred thousand dollar loan from defendant
bank, giving the bank a possessory security interest in the stock.
By agreement plaintiff's security interest was subordinated to that of
the bank. When Charter defaulted on the loan and the note, the
bank forced a sheriffs sale of the stock. The proceeds of the sale
satisfied the bank's entire claim, but only netted plaintiff eight hun-
dred dollars.
Plaintiff brought suit under rule 10b-5, alleging that prior to
the sheriff's sale, defendants had consulted among themselves about
how much information regarding the stock should be released to pro-
spective buyers. As a result of material omissions in the information
released, the stock allegedly brought a much lower price than other-
wise might have been obtained. Defendants objected that plaintiff,
not being the legal owner of the securities at the time of the sher-
iffs sale, had no standing to sue. This simplistic approach was re-
jected:
It would seem to be a far better approach, as is suggested
by plaintiff, to examine the various rights that each of the inter-
ested parties possessed in the securities prior to the sale, and
then, based upon this examination, make a determination as to
whether the rights possessed by the particular party in question
were sufficient to qualify that party as a 'seller' of the securi-
ties.74
In examining these rights the court acknowledged that the secured
parties were entitled to voting and dividend rights in the stock and
70. Id. at 965.
71. Id. at 966.
72. The court did not, however, specifically refer to plaintiff as a de facto
seller, as had the court in James.
73. 350 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1972).
74. Id. at 833.
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the right to transfer the securities. Charter at the time of sale, on
the other hand, had only the right to proceeds remaining after the
claims of the bank and plaintiff were satisfied. Each party was giv-
ing up something at the sale and, therefore, had to be considered
a seller.75 The critical element in this case was that the secured par-
ties had a direct right to the proceeds and did not have to receive
their money through Charter.76 Thus, the Cambridge court, like the
courts in James and Heyman, determined standing by analyzing the
economic interests of each party, rather than relying on legal title
as sole determinant of who was a seller for Birnbaum purposes.
3. Aborted Purchasers and Sellers.-When defendant's fraud
has prevented plaintiff from acquiring the requisite status of pur-
chaser or seller, a few courts have granted plaintiff standing under
rule 1Ob-5 as an aborted purchaser or seller, 77 rather than allow de-
fendant to escape federal jurisdiction by his own wrongdoing. Other
courts, however, have rejected or severely limited this doctrine.
In Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co."' plaintiff brought suit under
rule 1Ob-5, alleging that defendant had defrauded him by falsely
representing that certain purchases and sales of securities had been
made and also by selling plaintiff nonexistent securities. Defendant
moved to dismiss because plaintiff alleged no consummated purchases
or sales as required by Birnbaum. This argument was treated caus-
tically by the court:
Defendants' reading of the Statute and regulations there-
under is untenable. If their position was sustained, the law
would be that if a customers man at a brokerage house over-
stated the virtues of a certain stock, inducing his client to pur-
chase the stock for a price 20% above its value, then he and
the controlling partners would be liable to the customer under
75. The court noted a dictionary definition of "sell": "'To give up or make
over to another for a consideration; dispose of to a purchaser for a price.' The Ran-
dom House Dictionary of the English Language, p. 1296 (Unabridged Ed. 1966)."
350 F. Supp. at 833.
76. Id. at 834: "The Court feels that in such a situation the parties who are
directly entitled to the proceeds of the sale should be considered 'sellers' of the secu-
rities for purposes of the standing requirements under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5."
77. The term "aborted purchaser or seller" has been used loosely to refer both
to plaintiffs who because of defendant's fraud, have neither purchased nor sold, e.g.,
Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967), and to plaintiffs
who were fraudulently induced to delay their purchase or sale and suffered a loss
from the delay, e.g., Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
This latter class of plaintiffs, however, has standing as actual purchasers or sellers.
Accordingly, the phrase "aborted purchaser or seller" will be used to refer only to
plaintiffs who have been fraudulently induced not to purchase or sell.
78. 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
the Securities Act; but if the customers man took client's money
for purchase of stock and returned nothing to the client, then
this fraud is beyond the reach of the Securities Act. This inter-
pretation of the Securities laws flies in the face of the plain lan-
guage of Section 10(b), which proscribes fraud 'in connection
with the purchase or sale' of securities. The court finds no justi-
fication in the legislative history of the Act or in the cases for
reading this phrase as if it read merely 'in the purchase or sale'
rather than 'in connection with the purchase or sale.' 79
Birnbaum was found distinguishable because plaintiffs in the present
case had intended to make purchases and sales, but were fraudu-
lently prevented from doing so by defendant.80  Plaintiffs were
granted standing even though technically there had been no pur-
chases or sales.8 '
In Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc."2 plaintiffs
brought suit when individual defendants refused to complete an
agreement for the sale of the corporate defendant's stock to plain-
tiffs. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants entered into the agreement
of sale for the fraudulent purpose of using plaintiffs' offer as a bar-
gaining tool in negotiations with other would-be purchasers. As in
Goodman defendants argued that no sale had been consummated
and, therefore, that plaintiffs, being neither purchasers nor sellers,
lacked standing to sue. The court rejected the notion that a consum-
mated transaction was necessary. 83 The court also noted that while
failure to show a consummated transaction might often make it im-
possible for a plaintiff to show damages, a simultaneous agreement
by plaintiffs in the instant case to assign the stock to a third party
when purchased from defendant provided an appropriate measure
of damages, thereby justifying continuance of the suit.
The uncertain, case-by-case application of the aborted pur-
chaser-seller doctrine is reflected in two Ninth Circuit cases, Mount
Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell 4 and Manor Drug Stores v. Blue
79. Id. at 444. This is the view taken by the dissent in Blue Chip, 421 U.S.
at 764-65.
80. 265 F. Supp. at 444.
81. Id. at 447.
82. 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y.1968).
83. Judge Mansfield, speaking for the court, declared,
Although it has been suggested that an action under § 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act and SEC Rule lOb-5 may not be founded upon an aborted
agreement to buy or sell securities, . . . the law in this Circuit and else-
where now appears to be that it is unnecessary to prove a consummated or
closed purchase or sale as condition to the institution of such a suit.
Id. at 718, citing Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966); Good-
man v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Stockwell v. Reynolds
& Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); M.L. Lee & Co. v. American Card & Pack-
ing Corp., 36 F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
84. 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972).
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Chip Stamps.8 5 In Blue Chip, which is discussed in much greater
detail in part IV of this article, the Ninth Circuit held, in an opinion
later reversed by the Supreme Court, that plaintiffs who claimed
they were defrauded into not purchasing shares they were entitled
to purchase at bargain rates had standing to sue under 1Ob-5. A
different panel of that same court, however, took a much more re-
strictive view of a similar claim in Mount Clemens.
In Mount Clemens plaintiffs brought suit under rule lOb-5 for
damages, claiming that it had been precluded from bidding on and
purchasing securities representing one hundred percent of Missile
Dynamics Corporation at a sheriff's sale because of defendant's
fraudulent misrepresentation that said securities were worthless.
Mount Clemens appealed from the district court's dismissal for lack
of standing, arguing that Birnbaum had been so eroded by subse-
quent decisions86 that it no longer truly represented correct law. 7
This argument was rejected by the court, 8 but not before serious
consideration had been given to plaintiffs' asserted standing to sue
as aborted purchasers. Judge Eby stated that the cases setting forth
the aborted purchaser-seller doctrine were similar: all involved a
contractual relationship between plaintiff and defendant.8 9  A con-
tractual relationship was regarded as necessary to elevate plaintiff
to purchaser or seller status and plaintiffs inability to establish this
relationship was held "fatal to the contention . . . that they should
be afforded standing as 'purchasers' under the rationale of the
'aborted purchaser-seller' cases." 90
B. The Injunctive Relief Exception to the Purchaser-Seller Rule
The injunctive relief exception to the purchaser-seller doctrine
was first announced in Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.91 In
that case plaintiffs, minority stockholders of S.H. Kress and Com-
pany, brought suit under rule lOb-5 against Genesco for allegedly
85. 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
86. In particular plaintiffs relied on Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384
F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967);
Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1967); and SEC v. Broadwall Sec., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
87. The SEC filed an amicus curiae brief, urging that Birnbaum not be fol-
lowed.
88. 464 F.2d at 341.
89. Id. at 345.
90. Id. at 346.
91. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
fraudulent conduct in the acquisition by Genesco of ninety-four per-
cent of Kress stock and in its domination of Kress after acquisition.
Plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief, but District Judge
Bonsal dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of ac-
tion. 92
On appeal the Second Circuit considered whether plaintiffs,
who still held their Kress shares, had standing under lOb-5. Judge
Feinberg, speaking for the court, dismissed plaintiffs' claim for dam-
ages. He noted that plaintiffs had retained their shares and thus
would be unable to prove any monetary damages "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security" as required by the rule. 3
Then, turning to the claim for injunctive relief, Judge Feinberg
announced the landmark ruling that plaintiffs who seek only injunc-
tive relief under rule 1Ob-5 need be neither purchasers nor sellers
to have standing to sue.
[W]e do not regard the fact that plaintiffs have not sold their
stock as controlling on the claim for injunctive relief. The com-
plaint alleges a manipulative scheme which is still continuing.
While doubtless the Commission could seek to halt such
practices present stockholders are also logical plaintiffs to play'an important role in enforcement' of the Act in this way. 94
Judge Feinberg noted that granting private persons the right to seek
injunctive relief was consistent with the Supreme Court's admonition
that the Act must be construed in accord with its "broad remedial
purposes." 95  He added that a claim for injunctive relief should not
be subject to the same restrictions imposed in a suit for damages.96
This exception to the purchaser-seller rule in favor of plaintiffs
seeking injunctive relief was expanded to the greatest possible ex-
tent in Kahan v. Rosenstiel9 7  In that case Judge Adams of the
Third Circuit held that plaintiff, who was neither a purchaser nor
seller, had standing to seek injunctive relief under the Mutual Shares
case, even though he had not specifically requested this relief.98
Courts have been careful, however, to distinguish cases applying the
92. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
93. 384 F.2d at 547.
94. Id. at 546-47.
95. Id. at 547, citing J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bur., Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
96. 384 F.2d at 547, quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bur., Inc., 375
U.S. 180, 193 (1963).
97. 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
98. Id. at 174. Even in those circuits that have recognized the injunctive relief
exception, however, courts have strictly applied other limitations on the right to sue
under rule lOb-5, such as the requirement of a causal connection between the fraudu-




injunctive relief exception from those in which only damages were
sought. In Landy v. FDIC9 the same court of appeals that gave
that exception its broadest application in Kahan emphatically re-
jected any interpretation of that case that did away with the pur-
chaser-seller rule in damage suits.1"'
C. Rejection of the Purchaser-Seller Rule
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit became the only
circuit court to reject completely the purchaser-seller doctrine in
Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.' In that case plaintiff
was a shareholder in Bank Service Corporation, which had agreed
to purchase the leasing division of David Waite Pontiac, Inc. Bank
Service issued 7,000 of its shares to Waite as consideration and as-
sumed the liabilities of the leasing business, principally notes payable
to GMAC. Plaintiff delivered personal guarantees to GMAC on
these notes and all future liabilities. The leasing business subse-
quently failed and Bank Service defaulted on the notes. GMAC
then brought suit against the individual shareholders of Bank Serv-
ice, who, in turn, brought suit under rule 1Ob-5, alleging fraud in
the acquisition by Bank Service of the leasing business.
Plaintiff's third amended complaint was dismissed by the dis-
trict court. On appeal plaintiffs tried to circumvent the purchaser-
seller rule and, alternatively, argued that the rule should be "disa-
vowed."'1 2 Rather than stretch the terms "purchase" and "sell" any
further, the court of appeals held that the only purchase or sale of
securities in the instant case was the issuance of 7,000 shares to
Waite and rejected the notion that plaintiffs should be considered
sellers in that transaction. The court then considered whether plain-
tiffs who are neither purchasers nor sellers may obtain relief under
rule lOb-5.
After acknowledging the Birnbaum rule, the court noted that
there are two possible interpretations of its standing requirement:
99. 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
100. Id. at 156; see James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973).
The Fifth Circuit refused to apply this exception to suits for declaratory relief. Lut-
gert v. Vanderbilt Bank, 508 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1975).
101. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
102. Id. at 656. As stated by the court these arguments were "that their guaran-
tees were securities which they sold to GMAC; that the underlying notes are securi-
ties which they are being forced to purchase; that they were indirect sellers of the
7,000 shares of corporate stock .... "
On the one hand, it may signify that only purchasers or sellers
of securities have legal rights that are protected by Rule lOb-5.
In this sense, the analysis of the plaintiff's status-that is to say,
his relationship to defendant's violation of Rule 10b-5-really
determines whether the plaintiff is a person who has suffered a
legal wrong.
On the other hand, as the term 'standing' is more properly
used, it assumes that the plaintiff is a member of the class pro-
tected by the rule at issue, and addresses the question whether
he has a sufficient interest in a real controversy with the defend-
ant to entitle him to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court.
* . . In this sense, the requirements that the plaintiff must have'standing' raises a jurisdictional question under Article II of the
United States Constitution.'0 3
Although many cases had interpreted the purchaser-seller rule as
constitutionally required,104 Judge Stevens found this interpretation
erroneous. Then, noting that in Birnbaum Judge Hand had not re-
ferred to the Constitution or even mentioned the word "standing," he
concluded that the rule was merely "the court's understanding of the
class of persons protected by Rule 1Ob-5."11 5
Having surmounted the constitutional hurdle, Judge Stevens
noted that cases after Birnbaum had significantly expanded the
scope of protection of rule lOb-5 "to encompass additional types of
misconduct and to extend protection to a variety of persons not in-
cluded within the traditional definition of either purchaser or sell-
er."' 06  Moreover, the strict purchaser-seller rule was regarded as
inconsistent with the language and purpose of the 1934 Act and its
Supreme Court guidelines.
The language of Rule 10b-5 itself describes any act or prac-
tice which operates as a fraud or deceit 'upon any person in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of a security.' The Supreme
Court has repeatedly stated that this language should be given a
broad and flexible construction. Construing the words 'any per-
son' to include a purchaser or a seller but no one else is not con-
sistent with that admonition. . . . Moreover, a formal pur-
chaser-seller limitation is not consistent with the overriding re-
quirement that, in construing the 1934 Act, 'form should be dis-
regarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic
reality."1
0 7
The court declared that rather than protecting merely purchasers and
sellers, rule 1 Ob-5 was intended to protect
103. Id. at 657.
104. E.g., Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972);
Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1972). See also notes 25-37 and accom-
panying text supra.
105. 490 F.2d at 658.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 659 (emphasis supplied), citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
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persons who, in their capacity as investors, suffer significant in-
jury as a direct consequence of fraud in connection with a securi-
ties transaction, even though their participation in the transac-
tion did not involve either the purchase or the sale of a secu-
rity. 0
8
The court also rejected defendant's two final arguments: (1)
that discarding Birnbaum would subject the federal courts to an un-
manageable flood of litigation; and (2) that Birnbaum should be fol-
lowed to preserve national consistency in interpretation of federal se-
curities law. In response to the former argument, the court stated
that plaintiffs still would have to establish their membership in that
special class of persons protected by rule lOb-5. In any event, an
increased case load alone would not compel the court to reject what
it believed to be the correct interpretation of the rule.109 The court
responded to defendant's latter argument with the following points:
first, the extent of consistent interpretation was overstated by de-
fendant; second, consistency was less important than independent
appraisal; and last, consistent interpretation must come, if at all, from
a Supreme Court decision."' After dispensing with these final ar-
guments, the court held that
the basic holding of Birnbaum [that rule 10b-5 extends only to
fraud usually associated with the purchase or sale of securities]
was repudiated by a unanimous Supreme Court in the Bankers
Life case. We are convinced that the purchaser-seller limitation
is nothing more than an appendage to that holding without inde-
pendent justification. We hold that it is not part of the law of
this circuit.""
The only other case that flatly rejects the purchaser-seller rule
is Young v. Seaboard Corp."12  In Young the district court post-
108. 490 F.2d at 659, citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971).
109. 490 F.2d at 660. But see Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970)
(flood of litigation cited as reason for standing limitations).
110. 490 F.2d at 661. This argument completely ignores the Supreme Court's
reluctance to hear lOb-5 suits; twenty-five years passed between the first announce-
ment of a private right of action under lOb-5, Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69
F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), and the Supreme Court's first comment on the issue,
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). Whether this
desired consistency will result from Blue Chip, of course, remains to be seen. See
notes 183-213 and accompanying text infra.
111. 490 F.2d at 661. Contra, Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 155 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974), in which the court stated that "[niothing
in Bankers Life indicates that the Court intended to abolish the purchaser or seller
requirement for rule 10b-5 liability."
112. 360 F. Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973).
poned deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of standing until the
Tenth Circuit ruled in Vincent v. Moench," 8 an appeal involving the
validity of the purchaser-seller rule. The Vincent court subse-
quently held that "in a suit for equitable relief any person showing
a 'causal connection' between the fraudulent sale of a security and
injury to himself may invoke federal jurisdiction."
'' 1 4
In Young, however, Judge Anderson completely disregarded
the limited nature of Vincent and held that plaintiffs, who were mere
shareholders in a defunct bank and who had not purchased or sold
securities, had standing. He stated that "the Vincent decision sug-
gests that any person, not just one seeking equitable relief, who
shows a causal connection between the fraudulent sale of a security
and injury to himself may sue under rule lOb-5." 115 This interpreta-
tion is a gross misreading of Vincent."6
IV. Blue Chip Stamps and the Purchaser-Seller Rule
A. Lower Court Rulings
Blue Chip originated from a 1967 consent decree entered in
the settlement of a civil antitrust action brought by the United
States." 7 Under its terms the parties to the antitrust action were
required to present the court with a plan for the reorganization of
Blue Chip Stamp Company." 8  The plan was designed to vest ma-
jority control of the reorganized company in retailers who had used
Blue Chip's stamp services, but who were not shareholders of the
company. The plan included a merger of Blue Chip Stamp Com-
pany ("Old Blue Chip") into a newly formed company ("New Blue
Chip"). Six hundred twenty-one thousand shares or fifty-five per-
cent of the total shares in New Blue Chip were offered at bargain
rates to nonshareholder retailers who had used Blue Chip stamps.
To assure the desired shift in majority holdings, units consisting of
three shares of common stock and a one hundred dollar debenture
were offered for one hundred one dollars, although they had a rea-
113. 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973).
114. Id. at 435 (emphasis supplied).
115. Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp. 490, 495 (D. Utah 1973) (empha-
sis supplied).
116. In a case factually very similar to Young, the Third Circuit held that plain-
tiff-stockholders of a bank had no standing under rule lOb-5 because they were nei-
ther purchasers nor sellers of securities in connection with which the alleged fraud
occurred. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974).
117. United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967),
aff'd sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Script Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968).
118. The terms of the consent decree are discussed in more detail in the district




sonable market value of three hundred fifteen dollars. Nevertheless,
only about fifty percent of the shares offered were sold.
Two years later Manor Drug Stores, an offeree under the terms
of the consent decree who had not purchased any shares, brought
suit under lOb-5 119 against Old and New Blue Chip, eight of the
nine majority shareholders of Old Blue Chip, and the directors of
New Blue Chip, charging that they deliberately had emphasized only
the negative aspects of the offering in a section of the prospectus
entitled "Items of Special Interest."' 20  Manor alleged that this
scheme was to deter would-be purchasers from taking advantage of
the bargain to which they were entitled. Defendants filed a motion
to dismiss that was granted by District Judge Kelleher. 121
In support of the dismissal Judge Kelleher first noted that there
were no Ninth Circuit cases dealing directly with whether a mere
offeree has standing to sue under 1Ob-5. He then discussed the
trend toward liberal interpretation of the purchaser-seller rule of
Birnbaum. 2 Broad interpretation was regarded as "both sound
and necessary in order to vitalize the antifraud purposes of the Rule
and the securities laws."1 23 Judge Kelleher's views notwithstanding,
plaintiffs complaint was dismissed:
[T]he Court considers the Rule's application properly lim-
ited to situations where the defrauded party can show actual
damages, not merely the loss of a possible gain contingent upon
factors which never came into existence. . . Plaintiff's case
aptly demonstrates the soundness of so limiting operation of the
Rule; the causal nexus between defendants' alleged misrepresen-
tations and plaintiff's failure to purchase the Blue Chip 'units'
depends upon a number of highly uncertain factors such as proof
119. Two other bases for recovery advanced by Manor Drug Stores were dis-
missed by Judge Kelleher and never raised again on appeal. A claim for recovery
under § 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 was dismissed because plaintiff was not a
purchaser of securities from Blue Chip. Standing under § 12 is specifically limited
to purchasers. Manor's claim for recovery as a third-party beneficiary of the consent
decree was labeled "as unmeritorious as it is imaginative" and dismissed. Manor,
a nonparty to the antitrust proceedings, had no standing to enforce the consent de-
cree. 339 F. Supp. at 38-39.
120. Curiously, when shares in New Blue Chip were offered to the public about
one year after the consent decree offering, these negative aspects were not mentioned
in the prospectus.
121. 339 F. Supp. at 40.
122. Id. at 39, citing Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.
N.Y. 1966), affd, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966); Commerce Report. Co. v. Puretec,
Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp.
215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
123. 339 F. Supp. at 39.
that but for defendants' misrepresentations plaintiff would have,
indeed, purchased the offered 'units;' the Court doubts that
plaintiff, if permitted to maintain this action, could satisfacto-
rily carry the burden of such proof; in view of this uncertainty,
damages herein appear highly speculative. . . . This uncer-
tainty is not . . . peculiar to plaintiff's case but applies to any
party who, like plaintiff has not in fact entered into a transaction
having the effect of a purchase or sale of securities; since the se-
curities laws do not sanction recovery for losses based on specu-
lation or conjecture, the Court concludes that a party in plain-
tiff's position is not entitled to an action under these laws.
124
Plaintiff appealed this dismissal to the court of appeals, which
reversed the district court and ordered the complaint reinstated.
1 25
Realizing that any outright rejection of Birnbaum would be directly
contrary to Mount Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell,1 2 the majority,
through Judge Browning, focused on whether plaintiff might have
standing under some modification of Birnbaum.
Judge Browning first asserted that the granting of standing to
defrauded offerees was not inconsistent with the policy or intent of
1Ob-5.
The statute and rule were intended to protect the purity of
stock transactions from just such manipulative and deceptive
practices that deprive potential investigators of a reasonable op-
portunity to make informed and intelligent investment decisions.
It is obviously irrelevant to this purpose that the object of the de-
ceptive practices was to prevent purchases rather than to induce
them. And Congress and the Commission cannot have intended
to prohibit such fraudulent practices if they failed but not if they
succeeded. The language of the statute and rule does not re-
quire such a bizarre result.
127
Then, noting the aborted purchaser-seller and injunctive relief cases
discussed above, he concluded that defendants' alleged conduct was
within the substantive scope of lOb-5. The issue thus became
whether plaintiff was "barred from suing for damages because it suc-
cumbed to the fraud and did not purchase the offered stock."'' 2
The majority opinion stated two reasons for barring nonpur-
chasers and nonsellers from maintaining suits under lOb-5: inability
to prove actual loss; and inability to establish the requisite causal
connection between defendant's violation and plaintiffs loss.' 29  Re-
lying on Mount Clemens, however, Judge Browning declared that
124. Id. at 40 (citations omitted).
125. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973),
rev'd, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
126. 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972); see notes 84-90 and accompanying text
supra.
127. 492 F.2d at 140.
128. Id. at 141.
129. Id., citing Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.
1967); see notes 91-96 and accompanying text supra.
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a contractual relationship between plaintiff and defendant could
overcome these obstacles and afford plaintiff standing even without
a consummated purchase or sale.
Such contracts often furnish objective evidence of the reality of
a plaintiff's intention to purchase or sell but for the fraud, and
thus of causation. They may also fix the price, quantity, and
time of sale, thus making it possible to calculate damages. And
the existence of such contracts permits a reasonable circumscrip-
tion of a defendant's potential liability by identifying from
among the limitless number of possible non-purchasers those few
that the defendant chose to deal with himself'
3 0
The court then held that the consent decree in Blue Chip was the
functional equivalent of "the contractual relationship referred to in
Mount Clemens."'' The complaint, therefore, was reinstated.
Judge Hufstedler criticized the majority opinion:
The functions of a contract and of the consent decree are
. . . not the same. A contract to purchase or sell a security is
the equivalent of a purchase or a sale because the statute by def-
inition makes them equivalent. As Mount Clemens explained,
the unifying link among the cases granting standing to persons
who did not buy or sell 'is the existence of a contractual relation-
ship between the parties which elevated the plaintiff to the status
of statutory purchaser or seller.' [citation omitted]. A consent
divestiture decree cannot function similarly because it is not a
'contract' within the meaning of the statute and because no stat-
utory provision equates 'purchase' and 'offer pursuant to a con-
sent decree.' The essential statutory link between the appel-
lants and 'purchasers' is missing.
13 2
The majority was said to have improperly created an outright excep-
tion to Birnbaum; its effect was to confer standing in a situation in
which Congress had intended none.
1 33
B. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court in a six-three decision reversed the Ninth
Circuit's reinstatement of the complaint.3 3 This reversal was based
squarely on the Birnbaum purchaser-seller rule. "We are of the
opinion that Birnbaum was rightly decided, and that it bars respond-
ent from maintaining this suit under Rule lOb-5.' 5
130. 492 F.2d at 142.
131. id.
132. Id. at 143-44 (dissenting opinion). This same point is emphasized in both
the majority and concurring opinions of the Supreme Court decision.
133. Id. at 144.
134. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
135. Id. at 731.
Justice Rehnquist, author of the majority opinion, set forth in
three general categories the reasons for following the purchaser-
seller rule: (1) historical treatment of the rule; (2) "[a]vailable
extrinsic evidence from the texts of the 1933 and 1934 Acts;"'1 6 and
(3) "what may be described as policy considerations."13 7  After not-
ing that "virtually all" of the myriad lower court cases had upheld
the purchaser-seller rule'3 3 and that Congress had twice rejected at-
tempts to amend section 10(b) to include fraud "in connection with
the purchase or sale of, or any attempt to purchase or sell, any se-
curity,"'31 9 the opinion stated,
The longstanding acceptance by the courts, coupled with
Congress' failure to reject Birnbaum's reasonable interpretation
of the wording of § 10(b), wording which is directed towards in-
jury suffered 'in connection with the purchase or sale' of securi-
ties, argues significantly in favor of acceptance of the Birnbaum
rule by this Court.
40
The opinion found further support for the Birnbaum rule in
"[a]vailable evidence from the texts of the 1933 and 1934 Acts."' 41
Section 10(b) was found to deal only with fraud "in connection
with the purchase or sale" of securities, whereas section 17 of
the 1933 Act deals with fraud "in the offer or sale.' 1 42  Moreover,
section 16 of the 1934 Act was cited by Justice Rehnquist as specific
proof that "[wihen Congress wished to provide a remedy to those
who neither purchase nor sell securities, it had little trouble doing
so expressly."' 43  The opinion further noted that section 28(a)
of the 1934 Act limits any recovery to actual damages and that
[w]hile the damages suffered by purchasers and sellers pursuing
a § 10(b) cause of action may on occasion be difficult to ascer-
tain, [citation omitted], in -the main such purchasers and sellers
at least seek to base recovery on a demonstrable number of
136. Id. at 733.
137. Id. at 737.
138. Id. at 731. This reason has been offered in support of Birnbaum by other
courts. E.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
960 (1974).
Curiously the string of cases cited by Justice Rehnquist ends with a suggestion
to compare Eason v. GMAC, 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
960 (1974), with Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 977 (1967), two cases decided six years apart in which the Seventh Circuit
reached diametrically opposite conclusions on the validity of Birnbaum. No com-
ment is made in Blue Chip about the denial of certiorari in both these cases, even
though the Eason denial came less than seven months before certiorari was granted
in Blue Chip.
139. 421 U.S. at 732, reviewing the reports of the hearings on the proposed
changes.
140. Id. at 733.
141. Id.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970). This distinction is even more glaring because
10b-5 was drafted originally as a mere paraphrase of § 17. Freeman, Conference
on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967).
143. 421 U.S. at 734.
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shares traded. In contrast, a putative plaintiff, who neither pur-
chases nor sells securities but sues instead for intangible eco-
nomic injury such as loss of a non-contractual opportunity to buy
or sell, is more likely to be seeking a largely conjectural and
speculative recovery in which the number of shares involved will
depend on the plaintiff's subjective hypothesis.'
4 4
Justice Rehnquist also mentioned that many courts have justified
their finding of an implied 10b-5 cause of action by pointing to sec-
tion 29 of the 1934 Act, which provides that contracts made in vio-
lation of any of the Act's provisions are voidable at the option of
the injured party. 1 5 When there is no purchase or sale or contract
for purchase or sale, however, this justification for the private lOb-
5 cause of action does not exist. Finally, the language of various
express causes of action set forth in the 1933 and 1934 Acts was
used to support the Birnbaum rule.
The principal express nonderivative private civil remedies,
created by Congress contemporaneously with the passage of §
10(b), for violations of various provisions of the 1933 and 1934
Acts are by their terms expressly limited to purchasers or sellers
of securities. . . . It would indeed be anomalous to impute to
Congress an intention to expand the plaintiff class for a judicially
implied cause of action beyond the bounds it delineated for
comparable express causes of action.
146
Having noted the historical treatment of the purchaser-seller
rule and the statutory evidence in its support, Justice Rehnquist
turned to policy considerations:
When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal
with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legis-
lative acorn. Such growth may be quite consistent with the con-
gressional enactment and with the role of the federal judiciary
in interpreting it, . . . but it would be disingenuous to suggest
that either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1942 foreordained the present state of the law
with respect to Rule 1Ob-5. It is therefore proper that we con-
sider, in addition to the factors already discussed, what may be
described as policy considerations when we come to flesh out the
portions of the law with respect to which neither the congres-
sional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclu-
sive guidance.
1 47
.144. Id. at 734-35.
145. Id. The three cases cited by Justice Rehnquist in support of this argument,
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 n.4 (2d Cir. 1951); Slavin v.
Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799, 815 (3d Cir. 1949); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946), all predate Birnbaum.
146. 421 U.S. at 735-36.
147. Id. at 737 (citations omitted).
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that most commentators view the
purchaser-seller rule as "an arbitrary restriction which unreasonably
prevents some deserving plaintiffs from recovering damages which
have in fact been caused by violations of Rule 1Ob-5."'l Justice
Rehnquist felt, however, that this criticism was more than offset by
the advantages of the Birnbaum rule. The major advantages were
said to include minimization of potential problem areas of 10b-5 liti-
gation and creation of a healthy business atmosphere by limiting
I Ob-5 liability exposure to a readily ascertainable class of persons.
Considering first the litigation-oriented advantages, Justice
Rehnquist declared that "[t]here has been a widespread recognition
that litigation under Rule lOb-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness
different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litiga-
tion in general."'149 This vexatiousness stems, in part, from the diffi-
culties created by defendants' inability to obtain summary judgment
even when the lOb-5 claim is obviously without merit.'50 A plain-
tiff's ability to disrupt defendant's business by avoiding summary
judgment or dismissal gives lOb-5 suits "a settlement value to the
plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect of success at trial
. . . .,, Moreover, this settlement value can be increased
through abuse of federal discovery procedures. Therefore,
[w]ithout ,the Birnbaum rule, an action under § 1Ob-5 will
turn largely on which oral version of a series of occurrences the
jury may decide to credit, and . ..no matter how improbable
the allegations of the plaintiff, the case will be virtually impossi-
ble to dispose of prior to trial other than by settlement.152
Birnbaum, on the other hand, provides a simple test, usually
verifiable by documentary evidence, for the elimination of many
nuisance suits.
The Birnbaum rule undoubtedly excludes plaintiffs who have in
fact been damaged by violations of Rule lOb-5, and to that ex-
tent it is undesirable. But it also separates in a readily demon-
strable manner the group of plaintiffs who actually purchased or
actually sold, and whose version of the facts is therefore more
likely to be believed by the trier of fact, from the vastly larger
world of potential plaintiffs who might successfully allege a
claim but could seldom succeed in proving it.
15
3
148. Id. at 738.
149. Id. at 739.
150. The "high mortality rate" of motions to dismiss lb-5 claims is also noted
in Associated Builders, Inc. v. Alabama Power Co., 505 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1974).
Three possible grounds for dismissal are offered: (1) absence of law to support a
claim of the type made; (2) absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim; or
(3) disclosure of some fact that necessarily would defeat the claim. After Blue Chip
a disclosure that plaintiff was neither a purchaser nor seller of securities in connec-
tion with which the alleged fraud occurred will defeat a lob-5 claim for damages
and entitle defendant to dismissal.
151. 421 U.S. at 740.
152. Id. at 742 (emphasis supplied).
153. Id. at 743.
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A second source of vexatiousness in 10b-5 litigation is the
unique role oral testimony plays. A relaxation of the standing re-
quirements would only heighten this problem. "[G]iven the gen-
eralized contours of liability, the abolition of the Birnbaum rule
would throw open to the trier of fact many rather hazy issues of his-
torical fact the proof of which depended almost entirely on oral testi-
mony."1 54  While conceding the worth of oral testimony, Justice
Rehnquist stated that its abuse is particularly dangerous in 1Ob-5 liti-
gation. In apparent anticipation of this point, the SEC had sug-
gested in its brief that special corroboration rules and a more limited
measure of damages be adopted to offset dangers posed by Birn-
baum's abolition. The Court rejected these proposals: "[T]he very
necessity, or at least the desirability, of fashioning unique rules of
corroboration and damages as a correlative to the abolition of the
Birnbaum rule suggests that the rule itself may have something to
be said for it."'
155
The Court then evaluated how well the Birnbaum rule reflects
and supports accepted practices in the modem securities market.
The trend away from restrictive rules in the common-law torts of de-
ceit and misrepresentation was found inapposite to 1Ob-5 cases be-
cause "the typical fact situation in which the classic tort of misrepre-
sentation and deceit evolved was light years away from the world
of commercial transactions to which Rule lOb-5 is applicable." 156 In
the modem securities market, privity and face-to-face dealings are
rare. Abolition of the purchaser-seller rule would put defendants
at an unconscionable disadvantage.
[I]n the absence of the Birnbaum rule, it would be sufficient for
a plaintiff to prove that he had failed to purchase or sell stock by
reason of a defendant's violation of Rule lOb-5. The manner in
which the defendant's violation caused the plaintiff to fail to act
could be as a result of the reading of a prospectus, as respondent
claims here, but it could just as easily come as a result of a
claimed reading of information contained in the financial pages
of a local newspaper. Plaintiff's proof would not be that he pur-
154. Id.
155. Id. at 744.
156. Id. at 744-45. The relationship between the securities acts and common-law
theories of fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation now have come full circle. The acts
were necessary originally because common-law theories of recovery were overly re-
strictive. The requirements of privity, reliance, and factual misrepresentation re-
sulted in inadequate protection for the investing public. Because these common-law
restrictions are now being dropped, the Birnbaum rule is necessary to protect busi-
nesses from unlimited liability under lOb-5.
chased or sold stock, a fact which would be capable of documen-
tary verification in most situations, but instead that he decided
not to purchase or sell stock .... [T]he elements ,to which
the plaintiff would testify would be in many cases totally un-
known and unknowable to the defendant. The very real risk in
permitting those in respondent's position to sue under Rule lOb-
5 is that the door will be open to recovery of substantial dam-
ages on the part of one who offers only his own testimony to
prove that he ever consulted a prospectus of the issuer, that he
paid any attention to it, or that the representations contained in
it damaged him.
15 7
Retention of the Birnbaum rule, on the other hand, was said
to have three advantageous effects. First, the purchase or sale re-
quired to invoke lOb-5 "will generally be an objectively demon-
strable fact in an area of the law otherwise very much dependent
on oral testimony.' 1 58 Second, the rule precludes "bystanders to the
securities market" from using 1Ob-5 litigation as insurance against
their own faulty decisions not to purchase or sell.' 59 Last, "the in-
exorable broadening of the class of plaintiffs who may sue" that
would result from Birnbaum's abolition would do more harm than
good. Businessmen would be reluctant to continue in a field of "'li-
ability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class.' "160
The last topic addressed by the majority opinion was possible
application to Manor Drug Stores of some modification or exception
to Birnbaum. Manor's contention that the consent decree conferred
standing because it was the functional equivalent of a contract was
quickly rejected. In the first place, those who are not parties to a
consent decree have no standing to enforce it, either directly or in
collateral proceedings. 161  Moreover, functional equivalency to a
contract was found insufficient to grant standing.
A contract to purchase or sell securities is expressly defined
by § 3(a) of the 1934 Act [citation omitted], as a purchase or
sale of securities for the purposes of that Act. Unlike respond-
ent, who had no contractual right or duty to purchase Blue
Chip's securities, the holders of puts, calls, options and other
contractual rights or duties to purchase or sell securities have
been recognized as 'purchasers' or 'sellers' of securities for pur-
poses of Rule 10b-5, not because of a judicial conclusion that
they were similarly situated to 'purchasers' or 'sellers,' but be-
cause the definitional provisions of the 1934 Act themselves
grant them such a status.'
62
157. Id. at 745-46.
158. Id. at 747.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 748, quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E.
441 (1931).
161. 421 U.S. at 750, citing United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673
(1971); Buckeye Co. v. Hocking Valley Co., 269 U.S. 42 (1925).
162. 421 U.S. at 750-51.
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Finally, the Court rejected the notion that a new exception should
be created to benefit Manor. In addition to not being a purchaser
or seller, Manor was not even a holder of the shares involved. There-
fore, it stood in the same position as any other disappointed offeree.
After briefly reviewing the legislative history of the 1933 Act,
which requires a prospectus to disclose an offering's negative aspects,
Justice Rehnquist concluded that
Congress did not intend ,to extend a private cause of action for
money damages to the nonpurchasing offeree of a stock offering
registered under the 1933 Act for loss of the opportunity to pur-
chase due to an overly pessimistic prospectus. 103
Because Manor was unable to show either that the Birnbaum rule
should be rejected or that it had standing to sue under some modifi-
cation or exception to Birnbaum, the opinion of the Ninth Circuit
was reversed.
A concurring opinion was written by Justice Powell and joined
in by Justices Stewart and Marshall. Two points were emphasized:
"the significance of the texts of the Acts of 1933 and 1934 and es-
pecially the language of § 10b and Rule lOb-5";6 4 and the necessity
of the purchaser-seller rule as an effective deterrent of fraudulent
1Ob-5 litigation.165
First, Justice Powell asserted that "the starting point in every
case involving construction of a statute is the language itself."1 6 In
the instant case the critical language in section 10(b) and rule lOb-
5 was the phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
163. Id. at 754. In a fascinating footnote Justice Rehnquist left open the broader
"question of whether an implied action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-
5 will lie for actions made a violation of the 1933 Act and the subject of express
civil remedies under the 1933 Act." Id. at 752 n.15. Because the express civil action
sections of the 1933 Act are much more restrictive than the implied cause of action
under lob-5 (e.g., § 12(2) of the 1933 Act has a privity requirement not found or
implied in rule 10b-5), a forceful argument has been made that implication of a cause
of action under lOb-5 for violations of the 1933 Act would require an assumption
that Congress "casually nullified" the specific and intricate requirements for civil ac-
tions under the 1933 Act by its enactment of the 1934 Act. Rosenberg v. Globe
Air. Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1948); Montague v. Electronic Corp. of
America, 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (cause of action maintainable under §
11 of the 1933 Act cannot also be maintained under 10b-5). The argument that
an action maintainable under the express provisions of the 1933 Act may not also
be brought under lOb-5 has not been made in recent years, but Justice Rehnquist's
footnote may reverse this trend.
164. 421 U.S. at 755 (Powell, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 760-61.
166. Id. at 756.
security."' 7  This phrase covers only consummated purchases and
sales and not offers to purchase or sell. Additionally, the legislative
history and available extrinsic evidence from other sections of the
1933 and 1934 Acts supports this construction. 168  Justice Powell
regarded respondent's interpretation of 10b-5, which would have
given it standing even though it had not purchased or sold any securi-
ties, as an attempt to "rewrite the precise language of § 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5."'6 9  Furthermore, the SEC's advocacy of respondent's
interpretation was harshly criticized as "more than curious" and ut-
terly inconsistent with the Commission's traditional conservative ap-
proach to what may or must be stated in prospectuses. 70 Change
in lOb-5 standing requirements was said to be "a matter for the
Congress, not the courts."'
7 1
The remainder of the concurring opinion refuted the dissent's
charge that the majority favored corporate well-being over that of
the investing public. First, Justice Powell noted that the majority
interpretation of the purchaser-seller rule was "plainly compelled by
the language as well as the legislative history of the 1933 and 1934
Acts.' 72  Second, even if not so plainly required, that interpretation
was at least a fair and reasonable one. Last, the dissent's position
was said to invite fraud through assertion of totally spurious lOb-5
claims by plaintiffs who had not only failed to purchase or sell, but
who also had never seriously considered the investment.' 73
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Blackmun and joined
167. Id. (emphasis in original).
In its rejection of the Birnbaum rule, the Seventh Circuit also emphasized the
language of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. But in that case the court focused on the lan-
guage in lOb-5 proscribing conduct "which operates as a fraud or deceit 'upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."' (emphasis supplied).
"Any person," reasoned the court, cannot be narrowly construed to include only pur-
chasers and sellers, but must be interpreted to include other investors who did not
purchase or sell in the fraudulent transaction that caused their injury. Eason v.
GMAC, 490 F.2d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). A
broad view of § 10(b) also is set forth in Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 165 F. Supp.
440, 444 (N.D. Ill. 1967), in which the court emphasized that § 10(b) proscribes
fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" and not merely fraud
in the purchase or sale of any security. (emphasis supplied).
168. 421 U.S. at 756-57 (Powell, J., concurring); see notes 141-46 and accom-
panying text supra.
169. 421 U.S. at 759 (Powell, J., concurring). The lack of precision that charac-
terizes both § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 led to the debate on Birnbaum's validity. Justice
Rehnquist also found imprecision. "[We [are not] suggestiing that we are able
to divine from the language of § 10(b) the express 'intent of Congress' as to the
contours of a private cause of action under Rule lOb-5." Id. at 737.
170. 421 U.S. at 759 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell also criticized
the SEC in United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), for taking
seemingly inconsistent views.
171. 421 U.S. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring); accord, Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d
139, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
172. 421 U.S. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 761.
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in by Justices Douglas and Brennan, attacked the majority opinion
for exhibiting "a preternatural solicitiousness for corporate well-being
and a seeming callousness toward the investing public quite out of
keeping . . with our own traditions and the intent of the securites
laws."' 7 4  After reviewing the facts Justice Blackmun set forth a
point-by-point rebuttal of the majority and concurring opinions and
offered an alternate test for 1Ob-5 standing.
The dissent first criticized the majority's narrow construction of
the phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security":
From a reading of the complaint in relation to the language
of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and of Rule lOb-5, it is manifest
that plaintiffs have alleged the use of a deceptive scheme 'in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.' To my
mind, the word 'sale' ordinarily and naturally may be under-
stood to mean not only a single, individualized act transferring
property from one party to another, but also the generalized
event of public disposal of property through advertisement, auc-
tion, or some other market mechanism. Here, there is an obvi-
ous, indeed a court-ordered, 'sale' of securities in the special of-
fering of New Blue Chip shares and debentures to former users.
Yet the Court denies these plaintiffs the right to maintain a suit
under Rule 10b-5 because they do not fit into the mechanistic
categories of either 'purchaser' or 'seller.' This, surely, is anom-
aly, for the very purpose of the alleged scheme was to inhibit
these plaintiffs from ever acquiring the status of 'purchaser.'
Faced with this abnormal divergence from the usual pattern of
securities frauds, the Court pays no heed to the unremedied
wrong or to the portmanteau nature of § 10(b).1
75
The dissent next reviewed the legislative history of section 10(b)
and the circumstances surrounding promulgation of rule 1Ob-5. In
contrast to the majority and concurring opinions, which cited con-
gressional and commission intent to extend a private action only to
purchasers and sellers, Justice Blackmun repeatedly emphasized the
"broad purpose and scope of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934"
to support the notion that broader standing under section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 was intended. 176 Then, rather than focusing on plain-
tiff's status as a purchaser or seller, the dissent examined the rela-
tionship between the alleged fraud and a purchase or sale:
The question under both Rule 1Ob-5 and its parent statute,
§ 10(b), is whether fraud was employed . . . by 'any person
. . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.' On
174. Id. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 764-65 (emphasis supplied).
176. Id. at 765.
the allegations here, the nexus between the asserted fraud and
the conducting of a 'sale' is obvious and inescapable, and no
more should be required to sustain the plaintiff's complaint
against a motion to dismiss. 177
The dissent left the wording of the statute and rule long enough
to criticize harshly the majority's consideration of policy factors in
support of the purchaser-seller rule. The dissent argued that these
considerations mired the Court "in speculation and conjecture not
usually seen in its opinions." 178 In particular, the dissent castigated
the litigation-oriented factors considered by the majority:
Certainly, this Court must be aware of the realities of life,
but it is unwarranted for the Court to take a form of attenuated
judicial notice of the motivations that defense counsel may have
in settling a case, or of the difficulties that a plaintiff may have
in proving his claim.
Perhaps it is true that more cases that come within the
Birnbaum doctrine can be properly proved than those that fall
outside it. But this is no reason for denying standing to sue to
plaintiffs, such as those in this case, who allegedly are injured by
novel forms of manipulation. We should be wary about heeding
the seduotive call of expediency and about substituting conven-
ience and ease of processing for the more difficult task of sepa-
rating the genuine claim from the unfounded one. 179
Finally, Justice Blackmun presented an alternate test for stand-
ing in which the validity of a 1 Ob-5 claim depends upon a "showing
of a logical nexus between the alleged fraud and the sale or purchase
of a security." 180 This test is admittedly the same as that proposed
by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Eason v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp.""' To counter the floodgates argument
against this proposal, Justice Blackmun echoed that court: "Sensible
standards of proof and of demonstrable damages would evolve and
serve to protect the worthy and shut out the frivolous." ''"2
V. The Post-Blue Chip Future of the Modifications
of and Exception to the Purchaser-Seller Rule
Blue Chip simply held that only purchasers and sellers have
standing to sue under lOb-5; Birnbaum, announced twenty-three
years earlier, was affirmed. After Birnbaum courts developed a
number of modifications and exceptions to the purchaser-seller rule,
177. Id. at 768; accord, Eason v. GMAC, 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 165 F. Supp. 440 (N.D.
Ill. 1967).
178. 421 U.S. at 769-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 770.
180. Id.
181. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
182. 421 U.S. at 771 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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granting standing to plaintiffs who were not strictly purchasers or
sellers. A question arises: What is the post-Blue Chip future of
these modifications and exceptions to the purchaser-seller rule?
Outright rejection of the purchaser-seller rule 8' certainly can-
not survive Blue Chip, but the future of its modifications and excep-
tions is not so obvious. Projections may be derived, however, from
the following interrelated factors: (1) the view of the Blue Chip
majority toward a case-by-case approach to 10b-5 standing; (2) the
Court's disposition of three other recent cases dealing with private
actions under federal securities laws; and (3) language in Blue Chip
and other cases speaking directly to the various modifications and
exceptions.
A. General Considerations
Any consideration of post-Blue Chip developments must recog-
nize the Blue Chip majority's distaste for creation of modifications
and exceptions to the Birnbaum rule. The majority opinion de-
clared that affirmation of the functional equivalency approach taken
by the Ninth Circuit
would leave the Birnbaum rule open to endless case-by-case ero-
sion depending on whether a particular group of plaintiffs were
thought by the court in which the issue was being litigated to be
sufficiently more discrete than the world of potential purchasers
at large to justify an exception. We do not believe that such a
shifting and highly fact-oriented disposition of the issue of who
may bring a damage claim for violation of Rule lOb-5 is a satis-
factory basis for a rule of liability imposed on the conduct of
business transactions. Nor is it as consistent as a straightfor-
ward application of the Birnbaum rule with the other factors
which support the retention of that rule.
18'
Additionally, this year's Supreme Court decisions dealing with
private actions under securities laws indicate that even the accepted
modifications and exceptions to the Birnbaum rule may be in jeop-
ardy. These opinions consistently favored restriction of private ac-
tions. In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co."8 5 the Court reversed a
Seventh Circuit decision and held that absent a showing of irrepar-
able harm, plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief from defend-
183. See Eason v. GMAC, 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 960 (1974); Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973).
184. 421 U.S. at 755.
185. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
ant's clear violation of the Williams Act. 86 The Second Circuit also
was reversed in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman."7  In
that case the Supreme Court held that alleged fraud in the sale of
stock entitling a purchaser to lease an apartment in a nonprofit hous-
ing cooperative was not covered by federal securities laws because
this stock did not constitute a security within the meaning of those
laws. Finally, a Sixth Circuit decision, Securities Investor Protection
Corp. v. Barbour,88 met with a similar reversal when the Court held
that customers of failing broker-dealers have no implied cause of ac-
tion under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970.189
These four cases-Blue Chip, Rondeau, Forman, and Barbour
-indicate the Court's greater willingness to grant certiorari in secu-
rities cases and its inclination to restrict private actions under securi-
ties statutes. Lower courts will doubtless exercise greater hesitancy
in using modifications and exceptions to the Birnbaum rule to grant
1Ob-5 standing.
B. Specific Modifications and the Injunctive Relief Exception
In addition to the general indications that the Supreme Court
does not favor expansion of 1Ob-5 standing, consideration must be
given to language in Blue Chip and other Supreme Court cases that
addresses one or more of the modifications and exceptions to the
Birnbaum rule.
1. The Forced Seller Doctrine.-This doctrine, it will be re-
called, allows plaintiffs who have not yet sold their shares to sue un-
der 1Ob-5 when defendants' fraudulent conduct has left plaintiffs
with no choice but to sell or convert their shares.' 90 Two arguments
have been advanced in support of the doctrine: (1) the statutory
definition of "sell" is not limited to face-to-face transactions, but is
broad enough to include an involuntary conversion of shares into a
limited right to receive money or other shares; and (2) because
plaintiff has no choice but to sell, requiring proof of actual sale would
be a "needless formality," at least at the preliminary stages of a lOb-
5 suit.' 91
Neither of these reasons is sufficient, however, to support the
forced seller doctrine after Blue Chip. The majority and concurring
opinions carefully analyzed the statutory definitions of "purchase"
186. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970).
187. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
188. 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
189. 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa (1970).
190. See notes 39-60 and accompanying text supra.
191. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634-35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 970 (1967).
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and "sell" and adopted a rather restrictive view.' 92 There is a simi-
larity between the forced seller doctrine and the functional equiva-
lency doctrine rejected in Blue Chip. That decision clearly estab-
lished that a plaintiff must show more than that he is situated simi-
larly or functionally to a purchaser or seller with standing under the
literal terms of section 10(b). Moreover, the idea that an actual
sale is a needless formality contradicts Blue Chip's firm requirement
that an actual purchase or sale be shown before 1Ob-5 standing is
conferred. Therefore, when plaintiff still holds the shares in con-
nection with which the alleged fraud has occurred, Blue Chip re-
quires that his 1 Ob-5 complaint be dismissed.' 93
2. De Facto Sellers.-The de facto seller doctrine can be dis-
tinguished from the forced seller and aborted purchaser-seller doc-
trines, and from Blue Chip itself, in that the de facto seller doctrine
evolved from cases in which there had actually been a sale of securi-
ties. Plaintiffs in these cases, however, were not legal titleholders
of the securities sold.' 94 Thus, the issue in de facto seller cases has
not been whether plaintiff should be granted lOb-5 standing in spite
of the absence of a purchase or sale, but whether plaintiff's interests
have been so affected by the sale that he may be considered a seller
for purposes of 1Ob-5 standing. Considered in this factual con-
text,' 95 the de facto seller doctrine should survive Blue Chip. The
historical treatment and extrinsic evidence rationales offered in sup-
port of the Birnbaum rule focused on whether plaintiff must be a
purchaser or seller to have lOb-5 standing, not on who may be con-
sidered a purchaser or seller.
Moreover, the policy considerations cited in support of Birn-
baum do not bar application of the de facto seller doctrine. The
192. See notes 141-46, 162-69 and accompanying text supra.
193. Plaintiff, however, is not remediless. If plaintiff eventually is forced to
sell or convert his stock, he will have standing as a seller under lOb-5. If no actual
sale occurs, plaintiff will still have his state law remedies.
194. E.g., James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 493 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973).
195. Another fact common to the three de facto seller cases was that the legal
titleholder at the time of the fraudulent sale was made a defendant. Had the legal
titleholder not participated in the fraud and not been a named defendant, allowing
suit by the beneficial owner would have exposed defendant to double liability. A
solution might be to condition the beneficiary's standing under the de facto seller
doctrine on a refusal by the trustee to sue or a showing that a demand on the trustee
to sue would be useless. This rule would be analogous to rules governing derivative
actions by shareholders in a corporation. Note that in a derivative action under
1Ob-5 the individual plaintiff need not be a purchaser or seller as long as the cor-
poration is. E.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
litigation-oriented considerations focused on the vexatious nature
and special problems caused by oral testimony in lOb-5 litigation.
In de facto seller cases, however, the sufficiency of plaintiff's eco-
nomic interest in the securities sold can be established in the early
stages of litigation by documentary proof. Also, the fact of sale nor-
mally will be provable by documentary evidence. Finally, fraud in
de facto seller cases usually has been proven by showing the relation-
ship between the purchaser and the legal titleholder (plaintiff's fidu-
ciary) at the time of sale and not through oral evidence of misstate-
ments and omissions. The business-oriented policy considerations
of Blue Chip, which dealt primarily with the adverse effects of
spreading lOb-5 liability to an indeterminate class, also do not un-
dermine the de facto seller doctrine. De facto sellers are not parties
unaffected by the allegedly fraudulent sale. On the contrary, they
have a distinct economic interest in the sale. Certainly extension
of liability to real parties in interest does not impose any significant
additional burden on today's business world, in which it is common
knowledge that legal titleholders often are not beneficial owners.
Finally, the economic analysis employed in de facto seller cases
to determine whether plaintiff can be considered a statutory seller
complies with the Court's approach in other cases involving statutory
definitions. For instance, in Tcherepnin v. Knight 96 the Court, in
support of its holding that a withdrawable capital share in a savings
and loan institution could be considered a security, asserted that the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is remedial legislation that should
be broadly construed and cautioned that in construing statutory defi-
nitions, "form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis
should be on economic reality."'
197
3. Aborted Purchasers and Sellers.-The aborted purchaser-
seller doctrine is the Birnbaum modification dealt with most directly
by the Court in Blue Chip. Prior to Blue Chip there was wide diver-
gence among those courts that granted standing to plaintiffs under
this doctrine on how close plaintiff must have come to actual pur-
chase or sale. Thus, plaintiffs in Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co.
198
were granted standing even though there had been no purchases or
sales: they merely were parties to transactions intended by them to
be purchases and sales, but fraudulently prevented from becoming
196. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
197. Id. at 336. Similar economic analyses were employed by the Court in
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (SEC granted injunction
under the 1933 Act to halt defendants' sales of oil lease assignments), and SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (units in citrus groves held to be securities
for purposes of the 1933 Act).




such by defendants. In Mount Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell,199
however, defendants' prevention of purchases and sales was held in-
sufficient to confer standing. Rule 1Ob-5 was construed to require
at least a contract for the purchase or sale of securities.
The majority in Blue Chip clearly opted for the Mount Clemens
interpretation. The last section of the Court's opinion discussed and
rejected the novel "functional equivalency to a contract" rationale
employed by the circuit court. Thus, the aborted purchaser-seller
doctrine has been limited to plaintiffs who were, in fact, parties to
a breached contract for the purchase or sale of securities.
4. The Injunctive Relief Exception.-The post-Blue Chip fu-
ture of the injunctive relief exception is difficult to predict. In Blue
Chip plaintiff did not seek injunctive relief and, therefore, the Court
had no occasion to rule or comment directly on the standing require-
ments for a private litigant seeking injunctive relief from violations
of rule lOb-5. The rationales offered by Justice Rehnquist in sup-
port of the majority holding are not applicable to the injunctive relief
exception because each is discussed in the context of a damage suit.
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.,2 °° in which the injunctive
relief exception was originally formulated, was not discussed or even
cited in Blue Chip. Furthermore, no Supreme Court case has dealt
directly with the availability of injunctive relief under lOb-5 in
private actions.
Some cases address the availability of injunctive relief under
other sections of the 1934 Act, but shed little light on the issue of
standing under rule lOb-5. Injunctive relief under section 14 of
the 1934 Act201 was discussed in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, °2 but
the focus in Mills was on the power of courts to grant this relief.
Injunctive relief under section 13 of the 1934 Act 20 3 was discussed
in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co. 2°4  In that case, however, the key
issue was whether plaintiff had the burden of showing irreparable
harm before an injunction would be granted; plaintiff's standing was
not questioned.
The post-Blue Chip future of the injunctive relief exception is
199. 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972); see notes 84, 86-90 and accompanying text
supra.
200. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
201. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
202. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
203. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
204. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
made more uncertain because the general indications that may be
drawn from Blue Chip and other cases support both sides of the is-
sue. Support for the proposition that the injunctive relief exception
cannot survive Blue Chip may be deduced from the majority opin-
ion's dim view of any case-by-case approach to lOb-5 standing.20 5
Additionally, the possibility of adverse injunctive relief may be more
of a threat to businesses than potential monetary liability and, there-
fore, a larger club in settlement negotiations. It may be argued,
then, that the same policy considerations that support Birnbaum in
damage suits apply with greater force to suits for injunctive relief.2 6
Finally, inasmuch as Blue Chip clearly restricts the right to damages
under lOb-5 to purchasers and sellers and Rondeau permits injunc-
tive relief under section 13 only when plaintiffs can show irreparable
harm, a logical reading of these cases requires plaintiff to be a pur-
chaser or seller and to show irreparable harm to seek injunctive re-
lief under lOb-5.
On the other hand, two Supreme Court cases indirectly support
retention of the injunctive relief exception. In SEC v. National Se-
curities, Inc.20 7 the Court established that the purchaser-seller rule
imposes no limitations on the standing of the SEC to bring actions
for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5. 20 8  Be-
cause "both private and public actions arise under the same Rule,
and the legal problems involved in the two situations, while not iden-
tical, are closely related,"2 0 9 only a small leap in logic is necessary
to find that the purchaser-seller rule also does not limit standing in
private actions for injunctive relief. Furthermore, in SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau"' the Court held that under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, the SEC could obtain an injunction compelling
a registered investment adviser to make certain disclosures. The
opinion stated that "[i]t is not necessary in a suit for equitable or
prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for
monetary damages."21' This statement was cited in Mutual Shares
Corp. v. Genesco, Inc."'2 to support the injunctive relief exception
to the Birnbaum rule.
Thus, plausible arguments can be made in support of retention
or rejection of the injunctive relief exception to the purchaser-seller
rule. Rejection of this exception, however, would be more consist-
205. See note 184 and accompanying text supra.
206. See notes 147-60 and accompanying text supra.
207. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
208. Id. at 465-68.
209. Id. at 471 n.4 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
211. Id. at 193.
212. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
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ent with the spirit of Blue Chip and the trend of other recent Court
decisions in the securities regulation area. Moreover, exclusion of
nonpurchasers and nonsellers from injunctive relief under lOb-5




In Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.214 the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted the growing conflict among
the circuits concerning validity of the Birnbaum rule and urged the
Supreme Court to resolve the dispute.215 At first reading Blue Chip
appears to provide the hoped-for final resolution of all disputes about
Birnbaum's validity. Stated simply, Blue Chip reaffirms Birnbaum
and requires that to have standing to sue for damages under 1Ob-5 a
putative plaintiff must be either a purchaser or a seller of securities in
connection with which the alleged fraud occurred. Unfortunately, se-
curities fraud and securities litigation are not always so simple: Blue
Chip leaves many questions unanswered. For example, genuine
disputes still exist about whether de facto sellers have standing under
1Ob-5 and whether plaintiffs seeking lOb-5 injunctive relief must be
purchasers or sellers.
The Blue Chip opinion, unlike the Birnbaum opinion, is quite
extensive and sets forth in great detail the reasons supporting the
purchaser-seller rule. Confusion and conflict may be avoided if
courts look to the broad policy behind Blue Chip as well as to the
Court's narrow holding. This treatment will allow courts to be con-
sistent and clear in providing parameters of potential liability. If
conflict in securities fraud cases develops again, the Supreme Court
should be willing to grant certiorari and resolve the conflict.
Finally, it must be recognized that application of the Birnbaum
rule necessarily requires balancing the interests of the investing pub-
lic with the interests of those trading in the securities markets, as
213. In some instances state courts have granted even broader protection from
securities fraud than is available under lOb-5. Compare Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24
N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969) (corporation that has neither
purchased nor sold has cause of action against officers and directors for insider trad-
ing), with Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1972) (same facts, no
cause of action under lOb-5).
214. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
215. id. at 661.
well as protecting the integrity of the courts. Courts should not suc-
cumb to the temptation of twisting and distorting Birnbaum and Blue
Chip to protect an individual plaintiff and thereby sacrifice the
broader interests of those in the securities market. Clear guidelines
on potential liability should be set forth and courts should avoid the
inherent inconsistencies and abuses of a case-by-case approach.
Rather than provide every potential plaintiff with a federal remedy
for alleged securities fraud, federal courts must be willing to leave
plaintiffs to their state law remedies. The state courts, in turn, must
be more flexible in providing redress to investors who have actually
been injured in connection with their investment by fraudulent prac-
tices not involving a purchase or sale.
